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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BUSCK CORPORATION, dba BUSCH 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., and QUAIL-
BROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
COMPANY and ROYAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 19859 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Appellants to recover under 
liability insurance policies issued by Respondents STATE FARM 
FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY and ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third Judicial 
District Court granted Respondent STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
COMPANY'S Motion to Dismiss and Respondent ROYAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY'S Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY seeks 
affirmance of the Order of Dismissal entered in its favor by the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, herein referred to 
as STATE FARM, incorporates by reference the Statement of Facts 
contained in the Brief of ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY, herein 
referred to as ROYAL, with the following additions: 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY issued a condominium 
apartment policy to BUSCH DEVELOPMENT CORP, dba QUAILBROOK 
CONDOMINIUM, QUAILBROOK EAST CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS1 ASSOCIATION 
for the period beginning August 15, 1980 and ending August 15, 
1981. (Record p. 36). The policy contained the following 
language in Section VII, D.: 
ffD. INSURED'S DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF 
OCCURRENCE, CLAIM OR SUIT: 
1. In the event of an occurrence, written 
notice containing particulars sufficient to 
identTfy the insured and also reasonably 
obtainable information with respect to the 
time, place and circumstances thereof, and the 
names and addresses of the injured and avail-
able witnesses, shall be given by or for the 
insured to the company or any of its author-
ized agents as soon as practicable. . . 
2. If claim is made or suit is brought 
against the insured, the insured shall 
immediately forward to the company every 
demand, notice, summons or other process 
received by him or his representative. 
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G. ACTION AGAINST COMPANY: No action shall 
lie against the company unless, as a condition 
precedent thereto, there shall have been full 
compliance with all terms of this policy, . ." 
(Record, pp. 36 and 56). Emphasis added. 
During the time period when this policy was in effect, 
the prior lawsuit of Earl Phillip Morgan et.al. vs. Busch 
Development, Inc., et. al. was filed. (Record, p. 3). 
The first notice received by STATE FARM against the 
subject liability policy occurred September 21, 1983, when STATE 
FARM was served with the Summons and Complaint initiating this 
lawsuit. (Record p. 34) . The notice was five years after the 
alleged occurrence; three years after commencement of the prior 
lawsuit and sixteen months after judgment was entered thereon. 
As a consequence, STATE FARM was deprived of its rights 
under the insurance contract to investigate the claim; attempt 
settlement; hire counsel of its choice and to defend the prior 
lawsuit. (Record pp. 34-35). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
APPELLANTS HAVE NO RIGHT OF INDEMNIFICATION FROM 
STATE FARM UNDER THE SUBJECT INSURANCE POLICY. 
Appellants have no right of indemnification against 
STATE FARM for the following reasons: 
A. BUSCH CORPORATION, dba BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC.: 
BUSCH CORPORATION, dba BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC., herein referred 
to as BUSCH, has no right of indemnification against STATE FARM 
because it was dismissed as a Party-Defendant in the prior law-
suit entitled Earl Phillip Morgan, et al vs. Busch Development, 
Inc. et. al., and Quailbrook Condominium Company was substituted 
in its place. Therefore, the judgment rendered in the prior 
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lawsuit is against QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY and not BUSCH. 
If one concedes that BUSCH is an insured under the subject STATE 
FARM policy, one must conclude there is no right of 
indemnification on the part of BUSCH because no judgment was 
rendered against BUSCH in the prior lawsuit. 
B. QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY: QUAILBROOK CONDO-
MINIUM COMPANY is not entitled to indemnification against STATE 
FARM under the subject insurance policy because QUAILBROOK 
CONDOMINIUM COMPANY is not a named insured. The named insured on 
the subject policy is BUSCH DEVELOPMENT CORP dba QUAILBROOK 
CONDOMINIUM, QUAILBROOK EAST CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION. 
(Record, p.36). Accordingly, QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY is 
also not entitled to indemnification against STATE FARM. 
Appellants have argued that a material issue of 
fact exists as to whether QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY 
qualifies as a named insured under STATE FARM'S policy. The 
argument fails to take into account that STATE FARM'S Motion to 
Dismiss was treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment and was 
supported by Affidavit. Appellants filed no Affidavit by way of 
response. Under such circumstances, Franklin Financial vs. New 
Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040, (Utah, 1983) applies. 
In that case, this court held: 
"The opponent of the Motion (Summary 
Judgment), once a prima facie case for Summary 
Judgment has been made, must file responsive 
Affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the 
trial court's conclusion that there are no 
factual issues. Rule 56(e). 
. . . 
Thus, when a party opposes a properly 
supported Motion for Summary Judgment and 
fails to file any responsive affidavits or 
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 
56 'e), the trial court may properly conclude 
that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact unless the face of the movant's Affidavit 
affirmatively discloses the existence of such 
an issue. Without such a showing, the court 
need only decide whether, on the basis of the 
applicable law, the moving party is entitled 
to judgment." 659 P.2d page 1044. 
Based upon Franklin Financial, the trial court was 
correct in deciding whether STATE FARM was entitled to judgment, 
POINT TWO 
APPELLANTS ARE BARRED FROM RECOVERY AGAINST STATE FARM 
DUE TO THEIR FAILURE TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF THEIR CLAIM. 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that STATE FARM had 
a contractual duty running in favor of Appellants, there is 
still the further question as to whether that duty was negated 
because Appellants failed to give STATE FARM notice of the claim 
associated in the prior lawsuit as required by the insurance 
policy. Under the insurance contract, it is clear that the 
insured must give STATE FARM written notice of any claim arising 
out of any occurrence "as soon as practicable". In addition, if 
suit were brought, the insured also has a duty to immediately 
forward all demands, notices, or summons received by it to STATE 
FARM. These requirements on the part of the insured are ai 
condition precedent to STATE FARM'S contractual duty under the 
insurance policy. Since Appellants breached the terms of the 
subject insurance policy, STATE FARM has no contractual duty 
running in their behalf. 
Courts have utilized one of three basic approaches in 
determining whether coverage should be afforded under policies 
requiring notice "as soon as practicable" when the insured 
breaches the condition. Each approach will be discussed 
separately. 
A. Approach One; The first approach is to determine 
whether reasonable notice has been timely given. If it has, 
then coverage is afforded under the policy. If it has not, it 
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is deemed to be a breach of the condition concerning notice and 
no coverage is afforded. Under this approach, time periods as 
short as six months between the date of the occurrence and the 
date of the notice have been deemed unreasonable. Matthews vs. 
Reliance Insurance Company, 534 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1975). See also 
Burningham Boys Club, Inc. vs. Trans America Insurance Company, 
325 So.2d 167 (Ala. 1976), eight months deemed unreasonable; 
Taylor vs. Royal Globe Insurance Company, 240 So.2d 497, (N. 
Caro. 1978) nine months deemed unreasonable; LfItalia Provisions 
Corporation vs. Interboro Mutual Indemnity Insurance Company, 
367 So.2d 968 (Ala. 1978) , one year deemed unreasonable and 
Aetna Insurance Company vs. Springlake, Inc., 350 So.2d 397 
(Ala. 1977), two years deemed unreasonable. 
In Equity General Insurance Company vs. Patis, 456 
N.E.2d 348 (111. 1983), the insured delayed nearly five months 
in giving notice to his errors and omissions carrier of a claim 
against him for professional malpractice. The insured claimed 
that before a delay in giving notice may serve as a basis for 
extinguishing the insurer's liability to an insured, the 
insurance company must show that it was prejudiced by the delay. 
As to that issue, the court held: 
"Patis reaches the misguided conclusion that 
it is well settled that whether or not an 
insurer is prejudiced by an insured's late 
notice of a claim is an issue of material 
fact. It is with this conclusion he goes 
awry. . . . While prejudice may be a factor in 
determining the question of whether an insured 
has given reasonable notice to the insurer, it 
is not a condition that will dispense with the 
requirement. . . Where, as here, the giving of 
notice has specifically been made a condition 
precedent to a right of action against the 
insurer, any prejudice resulting from a delay 
in giving notice becomes immaterial. . . The 
issue becomes not whether the insurer has been 
prejudiced but whether reasonable notice has 
been given. 456 N.E.2d at 350 and 351. 
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See also Yale vs. National Indemnity Company, 664 F.2d 
406 (4th Circuit, N. Caro. 1981); LfItalia Provisions Corp., vs. 
Interboro Mutual Indemnity Insurance Company, supra; Oregon Farm 
Bureau Insurance vs. Safeco Insurance Company of America, 438 
P.2d 1018 (Or. 1968) and Barnes vs. Wacco Scaffolding & Equipment 
Company, 589 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1979). 
In the case at hand, the acts which gave rise to the 
prior lawsuit occurred in 1978. The prior lawsuit was filed 
against Appellants in September, 1980. Judgment was rendered in 
May, 1982. The first notice of this claim was not received by 
STATE FARM until September 21, 1983 coincident with it being 
served with Summons and Complaint in the instant action. Notice 
in this case is therefore five years after the time when the 
occurrence initially happened; three years from the date the 
prior lawsuit was filed and over sixteen months since the date 
judgment was granted. There has been no evidence presented by 
the Appellants attempting to explain or justify their failure to 
give notice for these periods of time. 
Taking into consideration the time periods involved in 
the above-cited cases, all of which were deemed to be in 
violation of policies with "as soon as practicable" notice 
provisions, it is clear that the time periods involved in this 
case constitute a total breach of Appellant's duty to give STATE 
FARM notice and forward suit papers. The trial court was correct 
in determining that there was no insurance coverage owed by STATE 
FARM to Appellants. As was stated in Pharr vs. Continental 
Casualty Company, 429 So.2d 1018 (Ala. 1983): 
"Where an insured fails to show a reasonable 
excuse or the existence of circumstance which 
would justify a protracted delay, the court 
should as a matter of law hold that there has 
been a breach of the condition as to notice . 
. . " 429 So.2d at 1019. 
n 
A. Approach Two: The second approach taken by many 
courts in resolving the issue involves a two-step process. The 
court must first determine whether an insured's notice to his 
insurer was given "as soon as practicable" and, second, if not, 
whether the delay caused prejudice to the insurer's detriment. 
In cases dealing with a situation where there are no facts 
justifying the delay in giving notice or no explanation for the 
delay, as in the case at bar, courts have not imposed any 
significant requirement regarding an insurance company's burden 
to show prejudice. In Ideal Mutual Insurance Company vs. 
Waldrep, 400 So.2d 782 (Fla. 1981), in which an insured delayed 
in giving notice concerning the loss of his aircraft to his 
insurance carrier, the court, in holding for the insurance 
company stated: 
"We find that the trial judge overlooked the 
fact that in the absence of proof, the failure 
to give timely notice of loss is presumed 
prejudicial." 400 So.2d at page 785. 
See also United Services Automobile Association vs. 
Allstate Insurance Company, 662 P.2d 1102 (Colo. 1983) and 
Dairyland Insurance Company vs. Marez, 601 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1979). 
It is clear from the facts of the case at bar, that 
STATE FARM has been prejudiced due to the delay in receiving 
notice from the Appellants. STATE FARM has been prevented from 
investigating the facts surrounding the claim at a time when 
memories and physical evidence were fresh. Further, it has been 
deprived of its right to attempt settlement through normal 
adjustment procedures. It has been deprived of its right to hire 
counsel of its own choosing and to defend the litigation which 
followed the occurrence. At this point, one cannot argue that 
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STATE FARM has not been prejudiced because counsel defending 
Appellants in the prior lawsuit were competent and did all that 
could have been done had STATE FARM been allowed to obtain 
counsel of its choice. In Sears Roebuck & Company vs. Kartford 
Accident and Indemnity Company, 313 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1957) , the 
insured waited fourteen months to forward notice of a claim 
against it to its insurer. Notice arrived one week before trial. 
In a subsequent action against the insurer for indemnification, 
the Washington Supreme Court held that depriving an insurer of 
the right to protect itself against liability in a prior suit 
against its insured automatically constituted prejudice. The 
court stated: 
"To be deprived of that right constitutes 
prejudice, however imponderable the damages, 
and however efficient and competent the 
attorneys retained by the insured. . . . " 313 
P.2d at 353. 
Under Approach Two, the trial court was correct in 
dismissing STATE FARM as a Party-Defendant in the instant matter. 
C. Approach Three; Other courts have concluded that 
where a notice of claim is outside the parameters of "as soon as 
practicable" that prejudice against the insurance carrier is 
presumed and the burden shifts to the insured to rebut the 
presumption. 
I n
 Gerrard Realty Corporation vs. American States 
Insurance Company, 277 N.W.2d 863 (Wise. 1979) , a notice of claim 
was given twenty-two months after suit was commenced against the 
insured and after the same had been reduced to judgment. The 
court said that notice was outside the parameters of "as soon as 
practicable" and therefore created a rebuttable presumption of 
prejudice on the part of the insurer. The court further stated 
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that as a result of the insured's belated notice, the insurance 
company was denied an opportunity to investigate, defend or 
settle the claim brought against the insured. It further held 
that as a matter of law, the insurance company was prejudiced by 
not receiving notice until after the entry of judgment. 
In applying Approach Three to the facts of the instant 
case, it is clear that due to the late notice given STATE FARM a 
presumption of prejudice was created. In light of the fact that 
the notice was not received by STATE FARM until after the entry 
of judgment in the prior lawsuit, there is clear evidence that 
the presumption cannot, and was not, rebutted by Appellants. 
After the entry of judgment, the matter is concluded and hence 
the insurance carrier has been denied its right to invesitgate, 
settle and defend the litigation. Such a factual scenario is the 
clearest of all cases where an insurance carrier has been 
prejudiced by an insured's giving late notice of a claim. 
Under Approach Three, the trial court did not err in 
dismissing Appellant's claim against STATE FARM. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Appellants are not entitled to indemnif-
ication against STATE FARM because BUSCH is not the party against 
whom judgment was obtained in the prior lawsuit. 
Moreover, QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY is not 
entitled to indemnification against STATE FARM because it is not 
a named insured under the STATE FARM policy. 
Even if STATE FARM has a contractual obligation to one 
or both of the Appellants named herein, the trial court was 
correct in dismissing Appellants' action against STATE FARM 
because of the late notice given STATE FARM regarding the claim 
against Appellants in the prior lawsuit. This same conclusion is 
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reached whether the facts are analyzed under Approach One, Two or 
Three discussed in the body of STATE FARM'S Brief under Piont 
Two. ^y 
Respectfully submitted this &JS day of July, 1984. 
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